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In this paper, we discuss the role of cable television networks and their ownership struc-
ture in promoting competition in the local access market. First, we show that the dual
ownership of a local telephone network and a cable network, compared with separate
ownership, may increase or decrease incentives to invest in upgrading the cable television
network. Second, we argue that separate ownership of the two networks is important to
promote competition in local access.
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A cable television network can be upgraded to o⁄er telecommunication services and can
therefore compete with a public switched telephone network. In this paper, we discuss the role
of cable television networks and their ownership structure in promoting competition in local
access. Our objective is twofold. First, we investigate how the dual ownership of a telephone
and a cable television network, compared with separate ownership, a⁄ects incentives to invest in
upgrading the cable network.1 We measure the incentives to upgrade the cable network by the
resulting incremental pro￿t and show with a simple model, that there is no de￿nite relationship
between the incentives to upgrade and the ownership structure of the networks. Second, we
argue that separate ownership of the two networks is important to promote competition in local
access. We use our model to compare the equilibrium prices under the two ownership structures.
Even if a ￿rm that owns both networks upgrades its cable network, it should behave like a
multiproduct monopolist and it is unlikely that any meaningful competition between the two
networks will emerge. Only an independently owned cable television ￿rm will use its upgraded
cable network to compete with the telecommunications incumbent.
To our knowledge, competition between cable television networks and public switched tele-
phone networks has not been explicitly addressed in the literature. However, our article relates
to the literature on the relative advantages of the various forms of entry in the telecommuni-
cations industry and the literature on intermodal competition. Regarding the ￿rst literature
strand, Faulhaber (2003) analyzes regulatory initiatives to open segments of the telecommu-
nications market to competition and mentions cable networks as a viable alternative to the
incumbents￿local access telecommunications network. Bourreau & Dogan (2004, 2005), using
a dynamic model of technology adoption, study the incentives of an entrant to lease the incum-
bent￿ s local loops and compete ￿service-based￿ , or to build a more e¢ cient infrastructure and
compete ￿facility-based￿ . They show that the incumbent can delay the entrant￿ s adoption of
new superior technology, by setting low rental prices for the local loops. Dessein (2004) con-
siders competition between two established horizontally di⁄erentiated networks and shows how
customer heterogeneity a⁄ects nonlinear pricing strategies. Regarding intermodal competition,
Loomis & Swann (2005) develop and estimate a model of local competition. They ￿nd that
there is substantial competition between incumbents and entrants using wireless and high-speed
services.2 Finally, note that although we use a model of a multi-product monopolist, our setting
1Separate Ownership means that there is no meaningful overlap between the shareholders of the individual
companies. Dual Ownership means that the companies are largely held by the same shareholders.
2For a discussion of optimal pricing with intermodal competition, see Braeutigam (1979).
3has several nonstandard features, such as scope and coordination economies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the policy debate
related to the ownership structure of cable networks. Section 3 presents the model and section
4 characterizes the equilibria. The analysis is conducted in section 5 and section 6 concludes.
All proofs are in the Appendix A.
2 Policy Debate
In this section we give an overview of the policy debates surrounding the ownership
structure of cable television networks. First, we discuss the importance of facilities based entry
in promoting competition in local access. Second, we discuss the importance of cable television
networks in promoting facilities-based entry. Third, we discuss the impact of the ownership
structure on the incentives to upgrade the cable television network and on competition in local
access.
2.1 Facilities Based Entry and Competition in Local Access
In the US, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 promoted the entry of new ￿rms into the local
access market by two means in addition to own facilities entry: (i) the resale of the incumbent￿ s
services and (ii) the unbundling of the incumbent￿ s local loop.3 This was a new and promising
paradigm. The removal of high entry barriers to the local access market, associated with scale,
density and scope economies, would give entrants time to develop their customer base and to
build their own infrastructures.4 The EU experienced a similar process of liberalization.
3Local Access is the origination and termination of calls on local networks. In Own Facilities entry, new ￿rms
build their own local loop, switches, etc. This form of entry makes new ￿rms independent of the incumbent￿ s
network, but requires time and large investments. In Resale entry, new ￿rms buy the incumbent￿ s services at
a lower price than that charged by the incumbent to its clients and the new ￿rms resell these services to their
own clients. This form of entry is fast and cheap. However, the arbitrage between the wholesale and the retail
prices is the only pro￿t opportunity. Entry through Local Loop Unbundling is a hybrid between the ￿rst and
second forms of entry. New ￿rms lease unbundled elements of the incumbent￿ s local loop, and combine them
with their own infrastructure.
4The basic local telephone infrastructure consists of poles, conduits and underground plants. To a large
extent, this infrastructure is invariant to the number of circuits provided. In addition, the cost of this in-
frastructure constitutes more than a third of the total cost of the local basic telephone network. High capacity
transport is also subject to signi￿cant economies of scale. A more dense and even distribution of customers
allows the construction of a more e¢ cient transport network.
4Entry through resale and local loop unbundling rely on the Open Network Principle, ac-
cording to which, all telecommunications ￿rms should have access to the basic public telephone
network, under the principles of: (i) non-discrimination, (ii) transparency and (iii) cost ori-
entation.5
The open network principle is part of the legislation of many countries, e.g., the Access
Directive 2002/19/EC. However, it is hard to enforce. The incumbent can resort to obstruction
tactics which are hard to detect or to prosecute. In addition, even if prosecution is feasible,
due process takes time. In the 1974 antitrust suit against AT&T, the Antitrust Division of
the Department of Justice of the US asked for the divestiture of AT&T, on the basis of the
argument that the sectorial regulator, the Federal Communications Commission, would not be
able to stop AT&T from charging excessive prices and providing inferior quality for its rivals￿
access to the local networks (Noll & Owen (1988)).6 In other words, the request for divestiture
was based on the argument that the Federal Communications Commission would not be able to
enforce the open network provision. The process concluded 1984 with the break-up of AT&T.7
Aside from leaving entrants dependent on the incumbent￿ s infrastructures, the two alter-
native forms of entry constrain the entrants￿marketing options. In particular, resale does not
allow entrants much scope for product di⁄erentiation or innovation.
Figure1
Either due to the incumbent￿ s obstruction, or due to its intrinsic limitations, resale and the
unbundling of the local loop have, so far, produced very modest results both in the US and
the EU. As Figure 1 illustrates, incumbents continue to dominate local access after six years
of liberalization in the EU. After all, it seems that these two forms of entry are no substitutes,
even temporary, for facilities based entry.
5The existence of common costs makes the implementation of cost orientation hard. The legal battles in the
US, around the Telpak tari⁄ in the 60s, the ENFIA tari⁄ in the 70s and the Telecommunications Act in the
90s, illustrate these di¢ culties (Temin (2000)). See Hausman (2000) for a discussion of cost orientation.
6The suit alleged monopolization of the long-distance, local and equipment markets.
7Aside from an enforceability problem, the open network provision also seems to have a legitimacy problem.
In a recent judgement regarding VERIZON v. TRINKO (540 U. S. _ (2004)) the US Supreme Court stated the
following. ￿The 1996 Act is in an important respect much more ambitious than the antitrust laws. It attempts
to eliminate the monopolies enjoyed by the inheritors of AT&T￿ s local franchises. (...) Section 2 of the Sherman
Act, by contrast, seeks merely to prevent unlawful monopolization. It would be a serious mistake to con￿ ate
the two goals. The Sherman Act is indeed the ￿ Magna Carta of free enterprise￿ , (...) but it does not give judges
carte blanche to insist that a monopolist alter its way of doing business whenever some other approach might
yield greater competition.￿
5"In the end, unbundling is an unnatural act for a vertically integrated provider. (...)
Realistically, a goal of perfect interconnection, or the complete absence of discrimi-
natory treatment of a¢ liated and una¢ liated partners, is unattainable. The embed-
ded local networks we have today were optimized for exclusive use by a monopoly
carrier, not for wholesale supply of unbundled elements or other networks", Woroch
(2002), pg. 709.8
A more benign interpretation of the current situation in the telecommunications markets is
that entry takes more time than what was initially anticipated. Geroski (1992) reports that for
a wide range of industries, it takes entrants considerable time to accumulate a small market
share. Given the complexity of the telecommunications industry, a slow entry process should
come as no surprise.
2.2 Cable Networks and Competition in Local Access
Regarding the feasibility of facilities based entry in promoting competition in local access,
there is a clear dichotomy between the residential and the non-residential markets.9 Deploying a
local access network for non-residential clients might not be a problem. Building a ￿xed wireless
access for a large corporate client, or building a ￿ber-optic ring for a commercial business
district, might be pro￿table investments.10 However, the situation for most residential clients
is di⁄erent. Unless the network is used to provide other services, it might not be pro￿table to
build. In this respect cable television networks can play an important role.
Table1
Among the various alternatives that provide local access to consumers, cable television
networks have three special characteristics that allow them to compete in the short run with
the public switched telephone network. The ￿rst special characteristic of cable networks is that
8Crandall (2002) reports evidence that the building of their infrastructure was fundamental for the success
of the ￿rms that entered into the local access market following the enactment of the Telecommunications Act.
Faulhaber (2003) predicts the failure of the current local loop unbundling model.
9Non-Residential and Residential customers have di⁄erent demand characteristics. Businesses often require
high-capacity connections for data or the provision of private branch exchange trunks.
10The ￿ber ring technology exhibits high ￿xed costs, and negligible marginal costs. The high ￿xed costs
limit the applicability of the technology: (i) to large business customers, or (ii) to areas with extremely high
population densities, like multi-unit residential buildings in urban areas. On the optimal pricing strategies for
utilities with large customers who have attractive service options, see Einhorn (1987).
6they can be upgraded to o⁄er telecommunications services. Cable television networks were
originally designed to broadcast information, i.e., to deliver a one-way signal.11 However, they
can be upgraded as ￿ber optics increases bandwidth, digitalization increases the quality and
the range of services, bidirectional ampli￿ers allow carriage of a return signal and switches
enable circuit-switching. An upgraded cable television network can o⁄er a complete range of
interactive services, such as ￿xed telephony, broadband access to the Internet through cable
modem and video on demand. The second special characteristic of cable networks is that
upgrading an existing network to carry a return signal is faster and cheaper than deploying
a new telecommunications network. Woroch (1998) puts the cost per household of upgrading
the cable telephony in the range of $400-$900 and estimates a pay back period of 6 years.
See Hat￿eld Associates (1997) for other estimates.12 The third special characteristic of cable
networks, illustrated in Table 1, is that in many countries, the cable infrastructure already
deployed o⁄ers good coverage.13
The Case of the United Kingdom The example of the UK is revealing of the impor-
tance of cable television networks in promoting competition in local access. After seven years
of legal duopoly, 1984-1991, Mercury, the rival of British Telecom, gained a 1% market share
of voice services. Mercury resold lucrative services, but did not invest in access lines. In 1991,
with the publication of the 1990 Telecommunications Policy Review, the Duopoly Review, cable
television ￿rms were allowed to o⁄er ￿xed telephony services.14 Cable telephony rapidly over-
11Cable television originated in the US in 1948 in order to enhance poor reception of over-the-air television
signals in mountainous or geographically remote areas. Community antennas were built on high points and
homes were connected to the antenna towers to receive the broadcast signals.
12The cost of enabling the supply of telephony services varies depending on the state of the existing cable
network. The traditional tree-and-branch architecture of cable networks is incompatible with telephony because
cascading chains of ampli￿ers in the distribution network make two-way communication impossible. Such
networks therefore have to be extensively overhauled. A recently built cable network may have replaced the
coaxial cable in portions of the network with ￿ber optics in order to enhance cable quality, improve reliability
and increase capacity. In addition, it may have adopted a star and ring architecture which is more conducive to
two-way communications. A cable network built with a hybrid ￿ber coaxial cable network architecture, capable
of supporting two-way communication, would need only minor additional upgrades. In the UK, ￿rms followed
a di⁄erent technological approach by deploying networks in which a separate coaxial cable and copper wire pair
were intertwined to form a single cable.
13"Homes Passed" is the expression used by the industry to designate homes covered by a network.
14Cable operators were allowed to o⁄er their own telephony services instead of merely reselling those of British
Telecom or Mercury. In particular, they were allowed to deploy their own switches and to interconnect freely
with other operators of adjacent cable franchises.
7took subscription television. Now there are more cable telephone subscribers than television
subscribers. In the third quarter of 2003, NTL Home had 2,809,500 customers, of which 864,600
where broadband customers, 1,294,800 were digital television customers, 2,489,800 were tele-
phony customers and 55,.100, i.e. 19.6%, took all three services. In the same period, Telewest
had 329,336 broadband customers, 911,191 digital television customers and 1,588,358 telephony
customers. In 1992, British Telecom had a revenue market share of 99.2% for UK geographic
calls. In the second quarter of 2003, NTL and Telewest had a dual, a revenue market share of
13.4% for UK geographic calls and of 19.7% for residential calls, whereas British Telecom had
respectively, 65.7 and 70.6%.15 These numbers are remarkable since cable networks only pass
around half of the households in the UK.
Other Cases The US provides a less compelling case for the importance of cable television
networks in promoting competition in local access.16 In 2003, cable television ￿rms supplied 2.5
million residential telephony lines, whereas there were 73.783 million basic cable customers and
102.900 million passed homes.17 Comcast Cable Communications and Cox Communications
were the largest providers with 63% and 31% market shares of cable telephony, respectively. In
Germany, none of the ￿rms that bought parts of Deutsche Telekom￿ s cable television network
have showed any interest in o⁄ering telephony services so far.18
There are other alternative technologies that give local access to consumers, like the Wireless
Local Loop,19 or the combination of Powerline Communications20 and Voice over the Internet
15The data on NTL is from the ￿rm￿ s ￿Quarterly Report￿ , the data on Telewest is from ECCA·s ￿Web Site￿
and the data on market shares is from OFCOM·s ￿Market Information￿ .
16See Chandler et al. (2002) for a discussion on the inhibiting factors.
17According to the National Cable & Telecommunications Association.
18The German market has several idiosyncrasies. First, the sales pitch of digitalization has been premium
programing, and increased channel choice. However, analogue, free-to-air, multichannel television, a substitute
for cable television, is ubiquitous. This hinders the penetration of cable television. Second, the cable network is
organized into four tiers, which do not necessarily belong to the same party, even in a given geographical area.
This reduces the ￿rms￿incentives to invest in upgrading their cable networks for telephony.
19The Wireless Local Loop is a set of technologies that connect subscribers to the public switched telephone
network using radio signals as a substitute for copper for all or part of the connection between the subscriber
and the switch. It includes cordless access systems, proprietary ￿xed radio access and ￿xed cellular systems.
20The Digital PowerLine uses the existing electricity infrastructure to transmit low frequency signals at 50
to 60Hz and higher frequency signals above 1MHz. The lower frequency signals carry power, while the higher
frequency signals can transmit data at a rate of 1Mbps. A conditioning unit ￿lters those separate signals, sends
electricity to the outlets in the home and data signals to a service unit. The service unit provides multiple
channels for data, voice, etc. Base station servers at local electricity substations connect to the Internet via
8Protocol.21 However, these alternatives are only starting to be deployed.
2.3 Ownership Structure, Incentives to Invest and Competition
The US Telecommunications Act of 1996 recognized the importance of the cable television
networks for providing an alternative infrastructure to the incumbent￿ s local access network. It
also recognized a potential con￿ ict of interests. Section 302 of the 1996 Act imposes structural
separation between ￿rms that own local telecommunications networks and ￿rms that own cable
television networks.22
The legislation of the European Community, re￿ ecting the political equilibrium between
numerous parties, is ambiguous. Article 2 of the Cable Directive 95/51/EC, required ￿rms
that simultaneously o⁄er telecommunications and cable television networks to put in place ac-
counting separation between the two activities. However, it indicated a preference for the full
structural separation of ￿rms o⁄ering telecommunications and cable television networks.23 In
1998, after the Review of the measures taken in response to Directive 95/51/EC, the Com-
mission concluded that accounting separation was insu¢ cient to increase competition in the
industry. In Communication 98/C 71/04, the Commission recommended that telecommunica-
tions and cable television activities should be legally separate, but added that the structural
separation was preferable. Article 8 of Directive 2002/77/CE, however, imposed only legal
separation.24 Several European countries followed a more assertive approach, either forbidding
￿ber or broadband coaxial cable. The system is similar to a neighborhood local area network.
21Circuit-Switched telephone networks establish a dedicated circuit between two end points for the duration
of a call to avoid latency, i.e., delays, in the transmission of data. However, latency control comes at the
expense of wasted bandwidth. Although there are many periods during a telephone conversation where no data
is transferred, a full 64-Kbps stream,on digital networks, is still required for the entire call. In Packet-Switched
networks, instead of dedicated connections, network resources are shared and used only when data is sent or
received in quick bursts. Using compression algorithms, telephone calls can be delivered at rates as low as 8
Kbps in a packet format, o⁄ering even more bandwidth e¢ ciency.
22Legal Separation means that ￿rms are di⁄erent legal entities according to the principles of corporate law.
Structural Separation means that ￿rms are legally separate and in addition there is no meaningful cross-
ownership between them.
23Accounting Separation of the activities of a dominant ￿rm makes ￿nance ￿ uxes more transparent and helps
to detect and avoid abusive practices by the dominant ￿rm regarding, e.g., price setting. Legal Separation of
￿rms makes assets and costs more transparent. However, accounting and legal separation do not solve the
fundamental con￿ ict of interests. Two legally separate ￿rms may be controlled by a third ￿rm, with majority
positions on both ￿rms. The third ￿rm will e⁄ectively control the assets of other two ￿rms.
24Preambles cannot be relied on as such. However, they provide useful insights into the rationale of the
Directives. Paragraph 11 of the preamble of Directive 99/64/EC which was amended by Directive 2002/77/CE
9ownership by the telecommunications incumbent of cable television networks or forcing the
telecommunications incumbent to divest, totally or partially, its participation in the ownership
of cable television networks.25
The basis for the Commission￿ s preference for structural separation is the argument that a
￿rm that owns both networks has no incentive to upgrade the cable network. A cable network
endowed with bidirectionality can compete with the telephone network, in relation to both
telephony services and broadband access to the Internet. It is unlikely that investment in
the cable network will generate additional net revenues as it will merely redirect revenues.
An independently owned cable television ￿rm does not have the same con￿ ict of interests.
Telecommunications services attract new clients. Paragraph 10 of the preamble of Directive
99/64/EC states that:
￿Where Member States have granted a special or exclusive right to build and operate
cable TV networks, to a telecommunications organization in the same geographic
area where it is dominant on the market for services using telecommunications in-
frastructure, that telecommunications organization has no incentive to upgrade both
its public narrowband telecommunications network and its broadband cable TV net-
work to an integrated broadband communications network (￿ full-service network￿ )
capable of delivering voice, data and images at high bandwidth. In other words,
such an organization is placed in a situation whereby it has a con￿ ict of interests,
because any substantial improvement in either its telecommunications network or
states that: ￿In order to achieve this transparency, it is necessary that the networks be operated by separate
legal entities which may, however, in principle be jointly owned. The requirement of legal separation would
therefore be complied with if the cable TV operations of a telecommunications organization were transferred to
a fully owned subsidiary of the telecommunications organization.￿
25In the UK, Belgium and Spain, the dominant ￿rm o⁄ering telecommunication services was prohibited from
o⁄ering cable television services. Holland took several measures to limit the dual ownership of the telecommu-
nications and cable television networks by the telecommunications incumbent and to separate structurally the
two activities. In 1997, KPN, the Dutch incumbent, was forced by the government to reduce from 100% to 20%
its participation in the cable ￿rm Casema. In the remaining countries, the pressure exerted by the Sectorial
Regulators, Antitrust Authorities combined with some ￿nancial di¢ culties has lead incumbents to divest their
participations in ￿rms that own cable networks. In December 1999, Swisscom, Siemens Schweiz, and Veba sold
group Cablecom to NTL. In July 2002, following pressure from the European Commission, Deutsche Telekom
divided its cable television ￿rm, Kabel Deutschland, into nine regional ￿rms which it has been progressively
selling (Press Note of the Commission: IP/00637). In May 2002, the merger of Telia and Sonera, the telecom-
munications incumbents of Sweden and Finland, respectively, was approved by the Commission, subject to the
condition, inter alia, that Telia divest its cable television network.
10its cable TV network may lead to a loss of business for the other network. It would
be desirable in those circumstances to separate the ownership of the two networks
into two distinct companies since the joint ownership of the networks will lead those
organizations to delay the emergence of new advanced communications services and
will thus restrict technical progress at the expense of the users, (...).￿
The OECD holds a similar position (OECD (1998)).
Similar to the Commission we favor structural separation. However, we disagree with the
Commission￿ s motivations for structural separation for two reasons. The ￿rst reason is that
there is no simple relationship between ownership structure and incentives to upgrade a cable
network. Dual ownership may, or may not, reduce incentives to upgrade the cable network.
The self-cannibalization e⁄ect may reduce the incentives of a ￿rm that owns both networks
to upgrade the cable network. However, there are other factors that can mitigate, or even
overcome, the impact of this e⁄ect and give a ￿rm that owns both networks more incentives to
upgrade the cable network than an independently owned cable ￿rm. Some of these reasons are:
(i) coordination economies in the joint operation of the two networks, (ii) di⁄erences in costs of
upgrading the cable network between the two types of ￿rms, (iii) regulatory uncertainty, (iv)
regulatory arbitrage and (v) attraction of new customers when networks are non-overlapping.
As seen in subsection 2.2, the example of Germany shows that structural separation is no
guarantee that the cable network will be upgraded and used to provide telecommunication
services.
The second and more important reason for which we disagree with the Commission is that
we think that the emphasis on the impact of the ownership structure on the incentives to
upgrade the cable network is misplaced. We believe that the impact of the ownership structure
in establishing competition in local access is far more relevant. Even if a ￿rm that owns
both networks upgrades its cable network, it will have no incentive to make the cable network
compete with the telecommunications network. Only an independently owned cable television
￿rm will use the cable network to compete with the telecommunications ￿rm.26
3 The Model
Since this is a policy oriented paper, we have developed a stylized model to make the
analysis transparent. In section 6 we discuss several extensions.
26Structural separation with the purpose of promoting competition in the local access raises legitimacy prob-
lems similar to those discussed in footnote 7, regarding the open network principle.
11There are two networks: (i) a public switched telephone network, PSTN and (ii) a ca-
ble network, CN. The PSTN belongs to the Telecommunications Company and provides ￿xed
telephony services, denoted by f. The CN belongs to the Cable Company and provides sub-
scription television services, denoted by t. If endowed with bidirectionality, the CN can also
provide ￿xed telephony services bundled with subscription television, denoted byb. We index
the products with subscript j = f;t;b. In subsection 6.2, we allow the cable company to o⁄er
￿xed telephony services in a bundle as well as separately, i.e. we allow the cable company to
practice mixed bundling. There are two possible ownership structures for these companies: (i)
separate ownership and (ii) dual ownership, through a Holding Company. Denote by i, the
independently owned cable company and denote by h the cable company owned by the holding
company. We index the two types of cable companies with superscript k = i;h.
The game has two stages, which unfold as follows under both ownership structures. In stage
1, the cable company decides whether to upgrade the CN. In stage 2, both companies choose
prices simultaneously.
3.1 Firms
Upgrading the CN involves a ￿xed cost, ’ > 0, independently of the ownership structure of
the cable company. Marginal production costs are constant for the three products. Denote by
cf, the marginal cost of telephony services. For subscription television and for the bundle, we
distinguish between the marginal cost of an independently owned cable company and a cable
company owned by the holding company. Denote by ck
j, j = t;b, k = i;h, the marginal cost of
product j, produced by cable company k.
We assume that there are Coordination Economies in the dual ownership of the two net-
works. Coordination economies stem from the cable company integrating its network with the
telephone network, e.g., sharing resources, if it is owned by the holding company.27 This means
that a cable company will have lower marginal costs if it is owned by the holding company,
than if it is owned independently. More speci￿cally: (i) ch
t := ci
t ￿ ￿t and (ii) ch
b := ci
b ￿ ￿b.
Parameter ￿t on [0;ci
t), captures coordination economies with respect to cable television services
and parameter ￿b on [0;ci
b) captures coordination economies with respect to the bundle.
We assume that there are Economies of Scope in the joint provision of subscription television
27There is a duplication of resources between the two networks, e.g., the local loops, switches, or backbone
networks. If such resources are managed jointly, they can be used more e¢ ciently. Besides, if both networks are
digitalized then, bandwidth considerations aside, either network can carry the two types of tra¢ c. This allows
the optimization of the tra¢ c ￿ ow over the two networks.
12services and ￿xed telephony services over the CN. Scope economies stem from joint marginal
costs of o⁄ering multiple services over the same network.28 This means that on the CN, the
production cost of the bundle is no larger than the sum of the production costs of subscription
television services and telephony services. More speci￿cally: ck
b := cf +ck






captures scope economies. Table 2 summarizes the cost structure.
Table2
We assume that the holding company behaves like a multiproduct monopolist and that
￿rms do not engage in price discrimination, i.e., ￿rms charge all consumers the same price for
identical services. The relevance of this assumption is discussed in footnote 35.
3.2 Consumers
There is a continuum of consumers, whose measure we normalize to 1. All consumers have
access to both networks. Consumers come in two types, indexed by ￿ = 1;2, which di⁄er only
on how they value the bundle. Denote by vf and vt, the consumers￿valuation for ￿xed telephony
services and for subscription television services, respectively; and denote by v￿
b := vf + vt + ￿￿,
the valuation of type ￿ consumers for the bundle, where ￿￿ is a parameter on < that measures
the marginal valuation for the bundle. Type 1 consumers, a proportion ￿ on (0;1], have a high
valuation for the bundle and type 2 consumers, a proportion 1 ￿ ￿, have a low valuation for
the bundle, i.e., ￿2 < ￿1. The high valuation for the bundle of type 1 consumers is due to the
convenience of interacting with a single ￿rm, i.e., signing one contract, paying one monthly bill,
calling one maintenance service, etc.29 The low valuation of the bundle by type 2 consumers is
due to some sort of consumer inertia, that makes them reluctant to sign on for a new service.
We assume that when consumers are indi⁄erent as to whether or not to buy the bundle, they
choose the former.
To close the model we make the following assumptions on the values of the parameters.
Let: (i) cf < vf, (ii) ci





￿ ￿ < 0 ￿ ￿1; k = i;h.
28According to Cluny (1995) for a multiple services operator, about 10% of its operating costs are incremental
to subscription television, 20% to telephony and 70% or more are non-attributable common costs. See also
Woroch (1997) for a description of the technological advances that allow scope economies between video and
voice services.
29Cooper (2003) provides evidence that following the introduction of new advanced services, cable television
￿rms were able to raise their fees by more than the increase in capital expenditures required to make these
services available.





We abstract from possible network e⁄ects since, typically, the PSTN has interconnection
obligations.
4 Characterization of Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize the game￿ s equilibria which we solve by working backwards
for the two alternative ownership structures.
4.1 Stage 2: The Price Game
In this subsection, we characterize the equilibrium prices under the two ownership structures
and for the cases in which the CN was, and was not, upgraded.
4.1.1 Non-Upgraded CN
Denote by pj, the price of product j = f;t;b. When the CN is not upgraded, the price
equilibrium is simple and is the same under both ownership structures. The telecommunications
and the cable companies are monopolists and charge their monopoly prices.30 We present this
observation in the next Remark for future reference.
Remark 1: In equilibrium, if the CN was not upgraded, then the telecommunications and the
cable companies charge, respectively: (i) pf = vf and (ii) pt = vt. ￿
To simplify notation, we de￿ne the monopoly pro￿t margins for telephony and cable televi-
sion as ￿f := vf ￿ cf and ￿k
t := vt ￿ ck
t, k = i;h.
Using Remark 1, the equilibrium pro￿ts of the telecommunications and the type k cable
television companies when the CN was not upgraded are, respectively, ￿f and ￿k
t, k = i;h:
30We assumed that a holding company that owns a non-upgraded network does not market the bundle for two
reasons. First, it seems unlikely that two legally separated ￿rms could o⁄er consumers the bene￿ts described
above, i.e., a unique contract, assistance and payment. Second, by de￿nition, there are no scope economies
if each service is provided over a di⁄erent network. Hence, bundling the services or selling them separately is
exactly the same as far as consumer valuation and marginal costs are concerned.
144.1.2 Upgraded CN with Dual Ownership
The assumption that the holding company behaves like a multiproduct monopolist implies
that it maximizes dual pro￿ts. Again the price equilibrium is simple.
Remark 2: In equilibrium, under dual ownership, if the CN was upgraded, then the holding
company charges: (i) pf = vf, (ii) pt = vt and (iii) pb = v1
b. ￿
The intuition of Remark 2 is straightforward. The holding company faces a trade-o⁄. It
can sell the bundle to type 1 consumers through the cable company. Alternatively, it can sell
telephony services and subscription television services separately through both networks to these
consumers. Given that there are economies of scope in the supply of the bundle and that type
1 consumers have a higher valuation for the bundle, it is more pro￿table to sell the bundle than
to sell both services separately: v1
b ￿ch
b = ￿f +￿h
t +￿1+￿+￿b > ￿f +￿h
t. The holding company
is a monopolist with respect to the three services and sets prices accordingly. Monopoly prices
allow the holding company not only to sell telephony and subscription television services to
type 2 consumers, extracting all their surplus, but also to induce type 1 consumers to pay more
for the bundle.
Using Remark 2, the equilibrium pro￿ts of the holding company when the CN was upgraded
are:
￿










4.1.3 Upgraded CN with Separate Ownership
In this case, there exists no equilibrium in which the ￿rms play pure pricing strategies
with respect to all products. First, note that the cable company has a dominant strategy
of charging the monopoly price for subscription television services, pt = vt.31 At this price,
the cable company sells subscription television services to type 2 consumers. Second, note
that the cable company has no equilibrium pure strategy for the price of the bundle and
the telecommunications company has no equilibrium pure strategy for the price of telephony
31Given that there are economies of scope and type 1 consumers value the bundle, the cable company would
like to induce these consumers to buy the bundle. Thus, the cable company would never charge less than
pb ￿pf ￿￿1 for subscription television services. This means that it will only sell subscription television services
to type 2 consumers. However, since the cable company has monopoly power over these consumers, it charges
the highest possible price of vt.
15services.32 In subsection 5.3, we discuss how to modify the model so that all price equilibria
are in pure strategies.
Next we construct the supports of the price distributions of telephony services and the
bundle.33 The telecommunications company may decide to sell only to consumers with a low
valuation for the bundle, whose proportion is 1 ￿ ￿, at price vf. Alternatively, the telecom-
munications company may charge a price lower than vf, to try to undercut the cable company
and also sell to consumers with a high valuation for the bundle. Let lf be the lowest price the
telecommunications company is willing to charge to sell to all consumers, i.e.,
(lf ￿ cf) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿f;
from which we obtain:
lf = cf + (1 ￿ ￿)￿f:
Value lf is decreasing in the proportion of consumers that have a high valuation for the bundle,
￿, and increasing in the monopoly pro￿t margin for telephony services, ￿f. A larger ￿ implies
a smaller opportunity cost of charging a price lower than vf to also sell to consumers with a
high valuation for the bundle; a larger ￿f implies a larger opportunity cost of charging a price
lower than vf.
The cable company can sell subscription television services separately to consumers with
a high valuation for the bundle, whose proportion is ￿, at price vt. Alternatively, the cable
company can sell the bundle to these consumers. Denote by lb the lowest price the cable












32Any price for telephony services, pf, on [cf;vf] can be undercut by the cable company by setting pb =








, which is always true, any price for telephony services will be undercut






can be undercut by the telecommunications
company by setting pf < pb￿vt￿￿1. Such a price is pro￿table for the telecommunications company if and only
if (pf ￿cf) > ￿f(1￿￿), or equivalently, if and only if pf > cf +￿f(1￿￿). Hence, undercutting is pro￿table if
the interval
￿
cf + ￿f(1 ￿ ￿);pb ￿ vt ￿ ￿1￿
is non-empty. This happens if pb > v1
b ￿ ￿f￿. For pb ￿ v1
b ￿ ￿f￿ the
telecommunications company prefers to set pf = vf rather than trying to sell to the type 1 consumers. But for
pf = vf the cable company prefers to set pb = vt + vf + ￿1 = v1
b. As v1
b > v1
b ￿ ￿f￿; the telecommunications
company would then undercut this price.
33See Varian (1980) or Narasimhan (1988) for the details on the method we use.
16Value lb is decreasing in the cable company￿ s monopoly pro￿t margin for subscription television
services, ￿i
t. A larger ￿i
t implies a larger opportunity cost of selling the bundle to consumers
with a high valuation for the bundle.
The cable company sells the bundle to type 1 consumers, if
pb ￿ pf + pt + ￿
1: (1)
As we argued at the beginning of this subsubsection, pt = vt. Replacing pj by lj, j = f;b, (1)
becomes lb ￿ lf + vt + ￿1. Thus, if the cable company charges lf + vt + ￿1 for the bundle with
probability 1, it sells the bundle to type 1 consumers and earns:
￿
d
b = (lf + ￿



















￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿f < 0,
this possibility is always feasible.
If the telecommunications company charges vf with probability 1, it sells telephony services
to type 2 consumers and earns:
￿
d
f = (1 ￿ ￿)￿f:
Remark 3: In equilibrium, under separate ownership, if the CN was upgraded, then: (i) the
cable company charges for subscription television pt = vt and (ii) the cable company plays a
mixed strategy with respect to the price of the bundle whose support is [lf + ￿1 + vt;v1
b] and
the telecommunications company plays a mixed strategy with respect to the price of telephony
services whose support is [lf;vf]. ￿
The intuition of Remark 3 is clear. The telecommunications and the cable companies com-
pete for type 1 consumers. For the telecommunications company, charging a price lower than
vf entails both an expected marginal bene￿t, associated with more sales to type 1 consumers
and a marginal loss, due to a smaller per consumer pro￿t on type 2 consumers. Similarly,
for the cable company, charging a price lower than v1
b for the bundle also entails an expected
marginal bene￿t, associated with more sales of the bundle to type 1 consumers and a marginal
cost, associated with less sales of subscription television services to type 1 consumers. Given
that there are scope economies in the supply of the bundle and that type 1 consumers have a
17high marginal valuation for the bundle, the opportunity cost of charging lower prices for the
bundle is smaller for the cable television company, than the opportunity cost of charging lower
prices for telephony services for the telecommunications company: lb ￿ lf ￿ ￿1 ￿ vt < 0. As a
consequence, on average, the cable company succeeds in undercutting the telecommunications
company and sells the bundle to type 1 consumers, earning ￿d
b = (lf + ￿1 + vt ￿ ci
b)￿. The
telecommunications company charges pf = vf with positive probability. Price pf = vf can be
interpreted as its regular price and lower prices can be viewed as discounts to attract type 1
consumers. In the Appendix A we present the equilibrium cumulative price distributions for
the bundle and telephony services.




f = (1 ￿ ￿)￿f,
and the equilibrium pro￿ts of the independently owned cable company resulting from the sale

















4.2 Stage 1: The Investment Decision
In this subsection, we characterize the ￿rms￿equilibrium investment decisions under the
two ownership structures.
The incremental pro￿t of upgrading the CN for the holding company is:
￿
HC := ￿
m ￿ ￿f = ￿￿
1 + ￿￿ + ￿￿b ￿ ’:
The incremental bene￿t has three parts: ￿rst, the Bundle Value e⁄ect, ￿￿1, second, the Scope
Economies e⁄ect, ￿￿ and third, the Coordination Economies e⁄ect, ￿￿b.









1 + ￿￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿f ￿ ’
The incremental bene￿t has again three parts: ￿rst, the Bundle Value e⁄ect, ￿￿1, second,
the Scope Economies e⁄ect, ￿￿ and third, the Business Stealing e⁄ect, ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿f. Since
lf = cf + (1 ￿ ￿)￿f is the lowest price the telecommunications company is willing to charge,
lf ￿ cf = (1 ￿ ￿)￿f, is the minimum pro￿t margin that it can earn with type 1 consumers.
By introducing the bundle and successfully undercutting the telecommunications company, the
18cable company can steal this pro￿t margin, (1￿￿)￿f, times the measure of type 1 consumers,
￿.34
5 Analysis
In this section, we discuss, ￿rst the impact of the ownership structure on the ￿rms￿incentives
to upgrade the CN and second the impact of the ownership structure on competition.
5.1 Ownership Structure and Incentives to Upgrade the CN
Next, we show that the holding company may, or may not, have more incentives than
the independently owned cable company to upgrade the CN. Note that: ￿HC ￿ ￿CC =
￿ [￿b ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿f].






, then the holding
company has more incentives than the independently owned cable company to upgrade the CN.






, then the independently owned cable company has more
incentives than the holding company to upgrade the CN. ￿
As referred to above, the investment in the upgrade of the cable network generates four
e⁄ects. Two of the e⁄ects are common to both the holding company and the independently
owned cable company. Both ￿rms will bene￿t from consumers valuing the bundle and also
from economies of scope. In addition, the holding company will bene￿t from coordination
economies with respect to the bundle and the independently owned cable company will bene￿t
from stealing business from the telecommunications company. The balance between the latter
e⁄ects determines which type of ￿rm has more incentives to upgrade. In addition, the net e⁄ect
is potentially ambiguous.
There are a three limit cases of interest. First, if all consumers have a high valuation for the
bundle, ￿ = 1, then the telecommunications company will have no captive consumers and will be
prepared to price at marginal cost, lf = cf. This implies that the telecommunications company,
34Our assumption that ￿rms do not price discriminate plays a crucial role here. First note that it is unlikely
that ￿rms could identify the two types of consumers. However, if ￿rms could set di⁄erent prices for di⁄erent types
of consumers, the telecommunications company would be willing to lower its price for type 1 consumers until
pf = cf. The cable company would then undercut this price, selling to all type 1 consumers at pb = vt+￿1+cf.
The Business Stealing e⁄ect would then be zero as the telecommunications company makes no pro￿t.
19on average, has zero pro￿ts, ￿d
f = (1￿￿)￿f = 0 and therefore the business stealing e⁄ect is null.
Consequently, the holding company has more incentives than the independently owned cable
company to upgrade the CN. Second, the pro￿t margin for telephony services may be zero,
￿f = 0, if either: (i) pf is regulated, or (ii) the existence of an attractive outside option, such
as mobile telephony, pushes vf down. In either case, although the telecommunications company
has captive consumers, the business stealing e⁄ect is again null and the holding company has
more incentives than the independently owned cable company to upgrade the CN. Third, in
the absence of coordination economies for the bundle, ￿b = 0, the independently owned cable
company has more incentives than the dually owned cable company to upgrade the CN.35
5.2 Ownership Structure and Price Levels
In this subsection, we argue that dual ownership of the two networks leads to higher
equilibrium prices than separate ownership.
Remark 4: If the CN is upgraded, then the prices of telephony services and the bundle are
lower under separate ownership than under dual ownership. ￿
Remark 4 follows trivially from Remarks 2 and 3. The holding company should look out
for the interests of both ￿rms as a whole. This means behaving like a multiproduct monopolist
and setting monopoly prices. Under separate ownership, the telecommunications company and
the cable company compete for consumers that value the bundle. Consequently, the prices of
telephony services and the bundle fall from their monopoly levels. Regardless of which owner-
ship structure generates more incentives to upgrade the CN, separate ownership is important
to promote competition in the local access.
This perspective of the behavior of a holding company could be criticized on the grounds
that perfect coordination among legally separate, dually owned ￿rms, may be hard to achieve.
It is di¢ cult to align perfectly the incentive schemes of the members of legally separate ￿rms.
Furthermore, price coordination among legally separated ￿rms has to be done carefully, to avoid
breaching competition law. However, casual empiricism suggests that some level of coordination
35As a monopolist, the holding company could su⁄er from productive ine¢ ciency, due to a slack in cost
control. This means that it could have higher production costs than the independently owned cable company:
￿b < 0, ￿t < 0. Alternatively, there could be a loss of coordination in operating two networks: ￿b < 0. In either
case, the holding company would have less incentives to upgrade the CN than the independently owned cable
company.
20among dually owned, legally separated ￿rms is possible.36 In addition, typically this level of
coordination will be enough to ensure that these ￿rms do not compete among themselves and
enable them to promote their common interests. Simple joint pro￿t maximization may be an
exaggeration, but assuming independent pro￿t maximization by the telecommunications and
cable ￿rms would be even more inappropriate. Joint pro￿t maximization is a simple way of
capturing the idea that some coordination within the holding company is possible.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we discussed the role of cable television networks and their ownership structure
in promoting competition in the local access market. We showed that there is no simple
relationship between the ownership structure and the incentives to upgrade the cable television
network. We also argued that separate ownership of the two networks is important to promote
competition in local access. To make the results transparent, we conducted the analysis with
a very simple model. In the remainder of this section, we discuss several generalizations of the
model in section 3.
6.1 Other Reasons
In this subsection, we discuss four additional reasons that might increase or decrease the
￿rms￿incentives to upgrade the CN.
First, if the holding company has easier access to ￿nancing than the independently owned
cable company, perhaps because it is a larger ￿rm, or because it has been in the market for
longer, then it could bear a lower cost for upgrading the CN. In this case, the holding company
could have, trivially, a larger incentive to upgrade the CN than the independently owned cable
company.
Second, the holding company owns two potentially competing local access networks. This
may put the holding company under pressure from the sectorial regulator or the legislator,
to sell one of the networks, possibly the cable network. If the risk that the holding company
is forced to sell the cable network increases signi￿cantly once the CN is upgraded, then the
holding company has no incentive to upgrade the CN, independently of other technological or
strategic considerations.
Third, there is typically some regulatory asymmetry between the PSTN and the CN. The
36See Parker and Roeller (1997) for evidence that cross-ownership a⁄ects the ￿rms￿pricing behavior.
21PSTN is subject to the open network provision, whereas the CN is not. For instance, broadband
access to the Internet through DSL is regulated, whereas broadband access to the Internet
through Cable Modem is not.37 Evading regulatory obligations could be a motive for the
holding company to upgrade the cable network.
Fourth, there is evidence of consumer substitution from ￿xed to mobile telephony (Barros
and Cadima (2000), Rodini et al. (2004)). In several countries, like Denmark, Portugal or
Sweden, the penetration rate of ￿xed telephony has been falling, while the penetration rate
of mobile telephony continues to rise. This implies that, potentially, there is a segment of
consumers that do not buy telephony services from the incumbent telecommunications company,
but buy subscription television services and might buy the bundle. The cable company will
be a monopolist with respect to these consumers, independently of the ownership structure.
However, in the absence of price discrimination, these consumers are more valuable to the
holding company than to an independently owned cable company. The reason is that the
holding company will be able to charge them monopoly prices, while the cable company has to
take into account the fact that it faces competition with respect to type 1 consumers.
6.2 Mixed Bundling
Next, we discuss the implications of allowing the independently owned cable company to
o⁄er telephony services, both in a bundle and separately, i.e., to practice mixed bundling. We
show that if mixed bundling is allowed, it is still true that either of the two ownership structures
can generate the largest incentives to invest in upgrading the CN.
Assume that consumers view telephony services o⁄ered through the PSTN and CN as
perfect substitutes. Denote by ci
b + ￿mb the unit cost of producing subscription television and
telephony services separately on the CN, where ￿mb on (0;￿) is a parameter that measures the
diseconomies of producing these two services separately instead of in a bundle. We assume that
the cost of producing the bundle is lower than the cost of producing the two services separately
through the cable network and that the latter is lower than the cost of producing the two
services through di⁄erent networks: ci
b < ci
b + ￿mb < ci
b + ￿ = cf + ci
t. Producing subscription
television and telephony services separately on the same network involves Economies of Scope,
but of smaller magnitude than those of producing both services in a bundle. This is a reasonable
assumption given that, if both services are produced separately, there will be a duplication of
some of the activities required to produce the services.38 Denote by p￿, the price of ￿xed
37See Sidak et al. (2002) for a discussion of this particular asymmetry.
38We assume that when the CN is upgraded, the holding company uses both networks to supply type 2
22telephony services provided through the CN.
The next Remark describes the new price equilibrium.
Remark 5: In equilibrium, under separate ownership, if the CN was upgraded and there is
mixed bundling, then the telecommunications and the cable companies charge: (i) pf = cf, (ii)
pt = vt, (iii) pb = cf + vt + ￿1 and (iv) p￿ = cf ￿ ", with " ! 0+: ￿
Using Remark 5, the equilibrium pro￿ts of the independently owned cable company if the





t + ￿ + ￿￿
1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿mb ￿ ’:
Practicing mixed bundling is more pro￿table for the independently owned cable company
than selling telephony services only in the bundle if, and only if, the pro￿ts obtained from
selling ￿xed telephony separately above marginal cost to type 2 consumers is larger than the
Business Stealing e⁄ect: (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ ￿mb) > (1 ￿ ￿)￿f￿.
With mixed bundling, the incremental pro￿t of upgrading the CN for the independently
owned cable company is:
￿
CC = ￿￿
1 + ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿mb ￿ ’:
The expression of the incremental bene￿t di⁄ers in three respects relative to the expression of
subsection 3.2. First, the Business Stealing e⁄ect, ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿f, vanishes because the telecom-
munications company now prices at marginal cost. Second, all type 2 consumers are supplied
through the same network, which allows to extension to all consumers of the Economies of Scope
e⁄ect, ￿. Third, type 2 consumers that purchase separately subscription television and tele-
phony services through the CN are supplied at a higher cost than type 1 consumers, (1 ￿ ￿)￿mb.
Recalling the value ￿HC from subsection 3.2, the di⁄erence in the incentives to upgrade the
CN between the holding company and the independently owned cable company is:
￿
HC ￿ ￿
CC = ￿￿b ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ ￿mb)
consumers. This allows the holding company to exploit fully Coordination Economies, but at the expense of
not exploiting fully Economies of Scope. In a previous version of this article we considered the possibility that
after upgrading the CN, the holding company shut down at least part of the PSTN and used mainly the CN to
provide both services, even to consumers that do not purchase the bundle. This allowed the holding company
to exploit fully Economies of Scope, but at the expense of forgoing at least part of the Coordination Economies.
Again, it was unclear which ownership structure generates the largest incentives to upgrade the CN.
23The expression above can be positive or negative, depending on the relative strength of the
Coordination Economies e⁄ect, ￿￿b, which bene￿ts the holding company and the Economies of
Scope e⁄ect, (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ ￿mb), which bene￿ts the independently owned cable company when
selling telephony services separately to type 2 consumers. This implies that if mixed bundling
is allowed, it is still true that either of the two ownership structures can generate the largest
incentives to invest in upgrading the CN.
Finally, in the case mixed bundling is less pro￿table than only selling telephony services
in the bundle, there is a prisoners￿dilemma type of commitment problem. The independently
owned cable company would like to commit itself not to sell telephony services separately, as
this ultimately decreases its pro￿ts. However, it may not be able to credibly commit to do
so. If the telecommunications company sets a price above marginal cost, it is pro￿table for the
cable company to undercut it and sell ￿xed telephony to type 2 consumers. Circumstances like
product di⁄erentiation or the existence of residential and non-residential consumer segments,
which we ignored, would give additional incentives to the independently owned cable company
to o⁄er cable telephony outside the bundle.
6.3 Heterogeneous Type 1 Consumers
Next we discuss the implications of allowing type 1 consumers to be heterogeneous with
respect to their valuation of the bundle, ￿1. The main consequence of this modi￿cation is
that all price equilibria are in pure strategies. Consider the model of section 3, except that
the valuation of the bundle of type 1 consumers, ￿1, is uniformly distributed on [0;￿], with
0 < ￿ < +1.
Now the cable company faces a downward sloping demand curve for the bundle. As a
consequence, in Remark 2 the cable company charges a price lower than the consumers￿larger
valuation of the bundle, vf + vt + ￿, which implies that consumer surplus will be positive.
Besides, when the CN is upgraded under separate ownership the price equilibrium is in pure
strategies. Otherwise, this article￿ s results continue to hold qualitatively. In particular, a
version of Proposition 1 and Remark 4 continue to hold. Note, however, that the model with
heterogeneous type 1 consumers involves a considerable expository cost, because the price best
response functions are kinked. See Brito and Pereira (2004) for the details.
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27A Appendix
In the appendix we prove the results in the main text. The proofs of Remarks 1, 2, 4, and
5 are obvious, and therefore ommited.
Remark 3: Denote by Gi(:) the cumulative distribution of the prices charged for product i.




f(p) = (p ￿ cf)f1 ￿ ￿ + ￿[1 ￿ Gb(p + pt + ￿
1)]g:





b(p) = (p ￿ c
i
b)￿[1 ￿ Gf(p ￿ pt ￿ ￿
1)]:
Equating for the two ￿rms the expressions of the expected pro￿ts, ￿d
j(:), to the expressions of the
equilibrium expected pro￿ts, ￿d




> > > > <









p ￿ vt ￿ ￿1 ￿ cf
￿
1
if p < lf + ￿1 + vt;






> > > > <
> > > > :
0
1 ￿
(￿1 + ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿f + ￿i
t
p + vt + ￿1 ￿ ci
b
1
if p < lf;
if lf ￿ p < vf;
if vf ￿ p:
￿
Proposition 1: (i) A given ownership structure provides more incentives than the alternative
ownership structure, if and only if, it generates an incremental pro￿t for upgrading the CN
no smaller than the alternative ownership structure. Therefore, the holding company has more
incentives than the independently owned cable company to upgrade the CN if and only if ￿HC￿
￿CC = ￿ [￿b ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿f] ￿ 0: As 0 < ￿ ￿ 1; ￿HC ￿ ￿CC ￿ 0 , ￿b ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿f:






, then (1 ￿ ￿)￿f is
on (0;￿b] meaning that (1 ￿ ￿)￿f ￿ ￿b: (ii) Equally obvious. ￿
28B Figures
EU15 Incumbents￿Revenue Market Share on Voice Telephony (Souce: European Telecoms
Regulation and Markets, 2004)














Table 1: Fixed Access Lines and Homes Passed in the EU per 100 Inhabitants
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Independent Cable ￿ ci
t ci




t ￿ ￿t ch
b = cf + ci
t ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿b
Table 2: Unit Costs under both Ownership Structures
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